LG May Ditch Its TV Business — Hisense Is Waiting

Nearly 60 years after GoldStar launched Korea’s first black-and-white TV, LG is now reportedly discussing whether its television business still deserves a place inside the company.

That is the real signal beneath the headline. LG executives recently visited Beijing for talks with Hisense officials over a possible restructuring or sale of the TV unit, according to Notebookcheck, citing Korean outlet EBN. No transaction has been confirmed. LG has also pushed back on the reports elsewhere, saying it has no plans to sell its TV business and calling the reports incorrect and misleading, according to India Today.

The tension is obvious. LG remains a globally recognized TV brand, especially in OLED, but the economics of the TV business have shifted toward scale, cost control, and platform monetization. Brand prestige still matters. It just may not matter enough when margins are thin and Chinese manufacturers are expanding with lower prices and improving hardware.

Nearly 60 years of LG TV history are now tied to one reported Beijing meeting

The reported talks matter because LG is not a marginal TV maker. Its television lineage goes back to 1966, when predecessor GoldStar released Korea’s first black-and-white TV. A sale or full retreat would end one of the longest-running consumer electronics stories in Korea.

Notebookcheck frames the possible move as another major exit from consumer hardware after LG shut down its smartphone division in 2021. At that time, LG shifted attention toward more profitable areas including electric vehicle components, robotics, and smart home technology.

That comparison is useful, but only up to a point. Smartphones and TVs have different supply chains, sales cycles, and platform economics. Still, the corporate logic looks similar: if a business consumes capital but cannot defend margins, even a famous brand can become expendable.

LG’s public position complicates the story.

LG confirmed to India Today Tech that it has no plans to sell its TV business, calling ongoing reports incorrect and misleading.

Another LG response cited by India Today said it is “difficult to establish” claims about sale discussions without an official review or company-level announcement.

So the correct read is not “LG is selling its TV business.” The sharper read is this: the possibility is credible enough to expose how much pressure legacy TV makers are under.

The TV profit squeeze has turned premium brands into cost-control businesses

The pressure comes from a brutal mix: cheaper competition, thin margins, and the difficulty of making mass-market TVs feel meaningfully different.

Chinese brands including Hisense and TCL have gained ground by competing aggressively on price while improving panel quality and features. The supplied reports describe this as a core reason LG is under pressure. It is also cited as the reason Sony recently sold a majority stake in its TV business to TCL.

LG’s dilemma is sharper because it still has a powerful premium identity. OLED TVs remain central to that reputation. But the broader TV market is not won only at the premium shelf. It is fought through manufacturing scale, logistics, panel sourcing, retail pricing, and the ability to move large unit volumes without destroying profitability.

The panel side also matters. Gizmochina notes that LG Display’s gradual exit from large LCD panel production reduced some of the vertical integration advantages LG Electronics previously had. In plain terms, when a TV maker has less control over key components, it may lose some room to manage cost.

That makes LG’s strategic problem less about whether it can build excellent TVs. It can. The harder question is whether building TVs remains the best use of capital when competitors can compress prices faster.

For a separate consumer-hardware example of how brand strength can collide with demand realities, MLXIO recently covered the 4-Day Casio G-Shock x GR Sale Leaves Global Fans Cold. The categories are different, but the broader lesson is familiar: recognition alone does not guarantee pricing power.

Omdia shipment data shows why Hisense and TCL are hard to ignore

The available market-share figures explain why Hisense would be a logical name in any restructuring discussion.

According to Omdia data cited in the related reports, TCL and Hisense accounted for around 14% and 12.5% of global TV shipments respectively last year. LG’s global TV share has recently stayed around the 10-11% range, or in the low-to-mid 10% range depending on the cited report.

The financial data is just as revealing. India Today cites the report as saying LG’s Media and Entertainment division posted 5.16 trillion won in sales and 371.8 billion won in operating profit in the first quarter. The same source says analysts see long-term profitability as difficult because TV margins often hover around 1% to 2%.

That is the heart of the issue. A TV business can generate huge sales and still be strategically unattractive if operating profit is structurally low.

The key indicators to watch are not just shipment share. They are:

• Operating margin: Whether LG’s TV-related division can expand beyond thin profitability.
• Panel costs: Especially after reduced large-LCD vertical integration.
• Premium mix: Whether OLED demand can offset pressure in mainstream sets.
• Average selling prices: A proxy for whether the brand still commands pricing power.
• Software revenue: Especially if LG leans harder into webOS and services.

GoldStar to OLED: LG’s possible retreat would mark a hardware-era reversal

LG’s TV story began with hardware engineering. It later became a global consumer electronics story. More recently, it became a premium-display story built around OLED.

A retreat would not mean LG failed at TV technology. It would suggest the opposite lesson: technical leadership can still lose strategic value if the category becomes too margin-constrained.

That pattern has already appeared elsewhere in TVs. The supplied material points to Sony’s move involving TCL as a comparable example. Japanese and Korean brands built much of the modern TV market, but Chinese manufacturers now have the scale, pricing aggression, and distribution momentum to challenge them across mainstream segments.

Hisense’s incentive is clear from the sources. It has expanded rapidly and become more visible globally, not only in budget TVs but also in larger Mini LED and premium categories. If it could acquire or partner around LG’s TV assets, the value could include brand equity, market access, manufacturing knowledge, or premium-category credibility.

For LG, the attraction would be different. A sale, partial divestment, or restructuring could free resources for businesses the company has already prioritized: EV components, robotics, and smart home technology.

A sale is only one possible structure, and probably not the simplest one

The cleanest headline is “LG sells TV business to Hisense.” The cleaner corporate reality may be messier.

Based on the reported facts, several structures remain possible:

• Full sale: Hisense takes over the TV business outright.
• Partial sale: LG reduces exposure while keeping some strategic assets.
• Restructuring: LG cuts costs, outsources more production, or narrows its lineup.
• Brand or platform arrangement: LG keeps parts of the software or brand relationship while reducing hardware risk.
• No deal: Exploratory talks end without a transaction.

The webOS angle is especially important. Android Authority cites EBN as saying LG could focus more on webOS and software services for monitors, automotive systems, and smart displays rather than building TVs itself. That would fit the broader capital-discipline thesis: reduce exposure to low-margin hardware while keeping a role in connected screens.

For consumers, the practical questions are straightforward but unanswered. Would LG-branded TVs continue? Would OLED support and software updates change? Would Hisense gain access to premium technology or distribution? None of the supplied sources confirms those details.

The next signal is whether LG denies, restructures, or narrows the TV unit

The most important evidence now will not be rumor volume. It will be corporate action.

If LG keeps denying sale plans and continues investing heavily in the TV division, the reported Beijing talks may fade as exploratory noise. If LG announces cost cuts, outsourcing, a partial asset sale, or a webOS-centered strategy, the thesis strengthens: LG may be preparing to own less of the low-margin hardware stack.

A full exit would be the dramatic version. A phased retreat would be the more plausible corporate version. Brand, patents, software, supply contracts, warranties, and regional sales channels are hard to separate overnight.

Either way, the reported Hisense talks point to a larger reset. The TV market is no longer just a contest over who builds the best screen. It is a test of who can justify owning the hardware business when margins are thin, Chinese scale is rising, and software may offer the cleaner long-term return.

The Bottom Line

• A sale would mark a major retreat from consumer electronics for one of Korea’s most historic TV brands.
• The report highlights how thin margins and scale pressure are reshaping the global TV market.
• LG’s denial means the outcome remains uncertain, but the strategic pressure on its TV business is clear.